China's ability to hit targets on the Australian mainland is 'real and growing', and it's about to get a whole lot worse.
A new report from the Lowy Institute, out Monday, warns that Beijing's military modernisation is turbocharging its strike capacity. Analysts Sam Roggeveen and David Vallance found China can already reach northern Australia with ballistic missiles fired from its South China Sea outposts. But the real game-changer? A coming boom in nuclear-powered attack submarines and a new long-range bomber.
'They appear to be on the cusp of a building boom,' Roggeveen said, pointing to the Bohai shipyard in Liaoning province, which is ramping up to produce between 4.5 to six submarines a year — including three to four nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and two ballistic missile boats.
The report estimates China will have 25 SSNs by 2035, up from around nine today. For context, Australia is scheduled to acquire its second US Virginia-class submarine under the AUKUS pact by that same year. The US currently has 53 nuclear attack subs and hopes to reach 66 by the mid-2030s, but its annual production has lagged at about 1.3 boats — well behind China's projected rate.
'Of the 25 SSNs we estimate will be in service by 2035, all are likely to deploy cruise missiles or perhaps hypersonic missiles,' the authors state. A fleet that size would give China 'the capacity to prosecute sustained strike operations against Australian targets, rotating boats through patrol cycles to maintain persistent threat coverage'.
'I don't think it's alarmist to examine the scale of the threat through a sober, fact-based analysis. The chances of a Chinese attack on Australia are small, but governments must look at capability, not just intent.'
China's surface fleet is also expanding rapidly — more destroyers, aircraft carriers and frigates. But the most immediate threat comes from the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The DF-26 ballistic missile, which entered service in 2016, is the only conventional Chinese system that can reach Australia without needing a bomber, ship or submarine to carry it into range — but only if fired from Beijing's artificial islands in the South China Sea.
China's intermediate-range ballistic missile stockpile has also grown significantly. These missiles, with a range of 4,000–8,000 kilometres, put northern Australia potentially within reach.
The report stresses it's not arguing China intends to attack Australia. Beijing's primary military focus remains closer to home, especially the Taiwan Strait. But Roggeveen and Vallance argue Canberra can't plan its defences based on intent alone.
'Governments can't plan their defences solely on the basis of what a country might do, because intentions can change in moments,' they write. 'Military action against Australia could occur as part of a larger war involving the United States or as a limited campaign to coerce Australia.'
They sketch scenarios where China strikes an offshore oil facility or hits ports, airports, bridges or railways as economic coercion. In a major regional conflict, bases across northern Australia would be prime targets for the PLARF.
'In the event of a major regional conflict, bases across northern Australia would be targets for the PLARF,' the authors state. 'The crown jewel of the PLARF is the DF-26.'
Australia's distance from China has long been a strategic asset. This report suggests that buffer is shrinking — fast.